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SITUATING INHERENT POWER WITHIN A RULES REGIME
SAMUEL P. JORDAN†
INTRODUCTION
Federal civil procedure is dominated by rules. This is not particular-
ly surprising. The introduction of a set of federal rules in 1938 was a 
landmark achievement, one which fundamentally altered the procedural 
landscape and which has shaped our discussion of procedural issues ever 
since. We are now conditioned to think of procedural requirements pri-
marily in terms of the rules, and—as the question posed by this issue of 
the Denver University Law Review suggests—we also think of procedur-
al reform in terms of amendments to those rules. 
But important though they are, the rules do not tell the whole feder-
al procedural story. There are other sources of procedural requirements 
that may be imposed in any given federal case, and that may displace or 
supplement those imposed by the federal rules. For example, federal sta-
tutes may—and in recent years increasingly do—contain procedural re-
quirements that differ from those found in the generally applicable feder-
al rules.1 So it is, for example, that the pleading standards for a securities 
action are different from those imposed in Rule 8(a)(2).2 This Essay fo-
cuses on yet another source of authority for procedural requirements that 
may be imposed in a federal civil case: inherent power. More specifical-
ly, my focus is on the use of inherent power to create and enforce proce-
dural requirements in the context of a given case, or what Professor Bur-
bank has referred to as ―inherent power in the weak sense.‖3 When inhe-
rent power is added to the mix, the menu of sources for procedural au-
thority is expanded even further, such that a litigant may be sanctioned in 
† Assistant Professor, Saint Louis University School of Law. I am grateful to Chad Fland-
ers, Andy Hessick, Marcia McCormick, Karen Petroski, and Howard Wasserman for helpful conver-
sations on this topic. Thanks also to Griffin O‘Hanlon for excellent research assistance. I dedicate 
this Essay to the memory of my father, Samuel P. Jordan, Jr., who was a proud member of the Den-
ver Law Class of 1971. He would have been thrilled to see his name finally appear within these 
pages. 
1. See David Marcus, The Past, Present, and Future of Trans-substantivity in Federal Civil 
Procedure, 59 DEPAUL L. REV. (forthcoming 2010) (manuscript at 40–47), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1428992 (discussing legislative intervention in 
the domain of federal procedure).
2. See Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 15 U.S.C. § 77z-1 (2006); Tellabs, 
Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 320–24 (2007) (interpreting the pleading stan-
dards under the PLSRA).
3. Stephen B. Burbank, Procedure, Politics and Power: The Role of Congress, 79 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 1677, 1686 (2004). This is to be contrasted with a strong notion of inherent power, 
which might be used to justify a court‘s right to fashion a prospective set of rules that could displace 
competing legislative rules. See id. (arguing that federal courts do not possess strong inherent author-
ity).
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the context of discovery by reference to a rule (Rule 37), a statute (28 
U.S.C. § 1927), or inherent power.4
The use of inherent power in the procedural sphere has a long histo-
ry, and its use has continued unabated in the seventy years since our em-
brace of a rules-based regime. Unfortunately, regular use has not trans-
lated to clarity about the precise nature of inherent power and its rela-
tionship to formal procedural authority.5 Courts routinely acknowledge 
that the presence of rules and statutes has implications for the use of in-
herent power, but are frustratingly vague when it comes to articulating 
the contours of those implications. To make matters worse, judicial prac-
tice—as opposed to judicial rhetoric—related to inherent power demon-
strates that the presence of the rules act as only a very weak restriction on 
the ability of courts to resort to inherent power. 
My goal in this short Essay is to describe the way that inherent 
power is understood and applied within our procedural framework, and 
to suggest the need for a more robust account of the contemporary rela-
tionship between inherent power and formal procedural rules. Part I de-
scribes two roles—one legitimate and one not—that inherent power can 
play vis-à-vis the rules. Part II examines how those roles are often con-
fused or manipulated, with the result that inherent power remains availa-
ble to justify judicial action in an undesirably large class of cases. Final-
ly, Part III explores ways to clarify the relationship between rules and 
inherent power. Although this clarification could be accomplished 
through a shift in judicial practice, a preferable approach would be to 
seek an amendment to the rules themselves that would better articulate 
4. See, e.g., Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 229 F.R.D. 422, 430 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (citing 
rules and inherent power to justify the imposition of discovery sanctions).
5. This is not to say that courts have not made any efforts to consider the question of inhe-
rent power carefully; clearly some have. For example, the Third Circuit discussed the issue at length, 
and developed an analytical framework for assessing questions relating to the use of inherent power. 
See Eash v. Riggins Trucking Inc., 757 F.2d 557, 560–64 (3d Cir. 1985) (en banc). But the Supreme 
Court explicitly rejected that framework in Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 47 n.12 (1991), 
and has never seemed inclined to develop a clear theory of inherent power.
Academic commentators have gamely attempted to supply what the courts have left undefined, and 
articles explaining theories of inherent power are plentiful, if inconsistent. See generally Sara Sun 
Beale, Reconsidering Supervisory Power in Criminal Cases: Constitutional and Statutory Limits on 
the Authority of the Federal Courts, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1433 (1984); David E. Engdahl, Intrinsic 
Limits of Congress’ Power Regarding the Judicial Branch, 1999 BYU L. REV. 75; A. Leo Levin & 
Anthony G. Amsterdam, Legislative Control over Judicial Rulemaking: A Problem in Constitutional 
Revision, 107 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (1958); Linda S. Mullenix, Unconstitutional Rulemaking: The Civil 
Justice Reform Act and Separation of Powers, 77 MINN. L. REV. 1283 (1993); Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., 
The Inherent Powers of Federal Courts and the Structural Constitution, 86 IOWA L. REV. 735 
(2001); William F. Ryan, Rush to Judgment: A Constitutional Analysis of Time Limits on Judicial 
Decisions, 77 B.U. L. REV. 761 (1997); William W. Van Alstyne, The Role of Congress in Deter-
mining Incidental Powers of the President and of the Federal Courts: A Comment on the Horizontal 
Effect of the Sweeping Clause, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1976, at 102. These articles are 
primarily focused on the constitutional relationship between inherent power and rules, but they 
generally stop short of taking a functional view at the relationship between inherent power and 
formal rules. My goal in this Essay is to be mindful of constitutional considerations, but to approach 
the question primarily from a functional standpoint.
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their intended scope. Such an amendment would make it easier for law-
yers to predict the procedural requirements that may actually be imposed 
in a given case, and would ultimately further civil justice reform by mak-
ing the rules—and thus the rulemaking process—more meaningful.  
I. TWO ROLES OF INHERENT POWER
Although inherent power may be applied in a wide range of con-
texts, it is generally invoked to perform the role of gap-filler or escape-
valve. This section describes both roles, and concludes that the first is 
defensible but largely unnecessary, while the second is constitutionally 
and functionally problematic. 
A. Inherent Power as a Gap-Filler 
By virtue of being constituted as a court and invested with judicial 
power, courts have long found that they have authority to impose proce-
dural requirements in the context of deciding cases. As far back as 1812, 
the U.S. Supreme Court concluded that ―[c]ertain implied powers must 
necessarily result to our Courts of justice from the nature of their institu-
tion.‖6 Thus, even when a formalized and prospective set of procedural 
rules does not exist, courts may fulfill their judicial function by develop-
ing and enforcing case-specific procedural requirements.7 It requires only 
a modest extension of that logic to conclude that these powers also per-
mit courts to use their inherent power to fill gaps left by an existing but 
incomplete procedural framework.8
Many of the early cases drawing on inherent power to justify the 
imposition of procedural requirements can be described as gap-filler cas-
es. Under the conformity regimes that governed federal procedural prac-
tice until 1934, federal courts were directed to apply the procedural rules 
of the states in which they sat.9 But state procedural rules were not ex-
haustive, and situations unavoidably arose that fell outside their cover-
age. In those situations, federal courts often created and enforced proce-
6. United States v. Hudson, 11 U.S. 32, 34 (1812). These powers are ―governed not by rule 
or statute but by the control necessarily vested in courts to manage their own affairs so as to achieve 
the orderly and expeditious disposition of cases.‖ Link v. Wabash R.R. Co. 370 U.S. 626, 630–31 
(1962).
7. A thornier question is whether courts could create a generally enforceable set of rules in 
the absence of legislative action. For an argument that they could do so, at least ―as a matter of 
common law development,‖ see Martin H. Redish, Federal Judicial Independence: Constitutional 
and Political Perspectives, 46 MERCER L. REV. 697, 727–28 (1995). 
8. Not all commentators have been willing to accept that extension, however modest. For a 
prominent criticism of the use of inherent power to fill gaps—however genuine—in a legislatively 
created set of procedural rules, see Van Alstyne, supra note 5. 
9. The statute in force immediately prior to passage of the Rules Enabling Act was the Act of 
June 1, 1872, ch. 255, §§ 5–6, 17 Stat. 196, 197. Earlier variations on the conformity regime had 
been in place since 1789. See Stephen B. Burbank, The Rules Enabling Act of 1934, 130 U. PA. L.
REV. 1015, 1037 (1982).
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dural requirements that were justified by a reference to inherent power, 
and those requirements were routinely upheld.10
The invocation of inherent power as a gap-filler has persisted even 
after the conformity regime was displaced by the federal rules. Courts 
properly understand the rules not as an attempt to describe the universe 
of permissible procedures, but instead as an effort to formalize and unify 
the procedures that are to be applied in specific situations.11 Thus, proce-
dural gaps are still inevitable, and courts continue to rely on inherent 
power to create case-specific procedures to fill those gaps.12 But while 
the continuing use of inherent power to address genuine gaps in the rules 
may be consistent with historical practice, it is also unnecessary in most 
cases because the rules themselves provide formal authority for that sort 
of judicial action. Specifically, Rule 83(b)—which permits judges to 
―regulate practice in any manner consistent with federal law, rules 
adopted under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2072 and 2075, and the district‘s local 
rules‖13—supports the imposition of case-specific requirements when 
other sources of procedural authority are silent.14 The use of inherent 
10. For example, the Supreme Court in In re Peterson approved the appointment of an auditor 
to review factual issues in a federal case filed in New York, despite the fact that no such practice was 
specifically authorized either by the procedural code of that state or by a federal statute. 253 U.S. 
300, 312–14 (1920). New York permitted the appointment of a referee in cases on long accounts, but 
Peterson was not such a case. Id. at 308–09. The absence of a federal statute was relevant because 
the Court had previously recognized that Congress could legislatively override the 1872 Conformity 
Act. See Ex parte Fisk, 113 U.S. 713, 721 (1885) (―[I]f congress has legislated on this subject and 
prescribed a definite role for the government of its own courts, it is to that extent exclusive of any 
legislation of the states in the same matter.‖). Given that the alternative sources of procedural author-
ity were silent on the matter, Justice Brandeis had no hesitation finding the appointment within the 
inherent power of courts ―to provide themselves with appropriate instruments required for the per-
formance of their duties.‖ Peterson, 253 U.S. at 312. But in describing the scope of this power, it is 
notable that Justice Brandeis included in quotations the caveat that the power exists ―at least in the 
absence of legislation to the contrary.‖ Id. For other examples of conformity-era invocations of 
inherent power, see Enelow v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 293 U.S. 379, 381–82 (1935); Bowen v. Chase, 94 
U.S. 812, 824 (1876). But these cases can be misleading when it comes to the nature and scope of 
inherent power. In many instances, courts invoked the rhetoric of inherent power but simultaneously 
found that the power to create the requirements in question had been expressly conferred by statute. 
Burbank, supra note 3, at 1687 n.33.
11. Ryan, supra note 5, at 775–79 (discussing the non-exhaustive nature of the federal rules). 
12. Of course, case-specific procedures issued pursuant to inherent authority are not the only 
way that procedural gaps may be filled. Local rules and standing orders created under the authority 
of Rule 83 also serve the same function, although they do so in a more formal and prospective way. 
See Ryan, supra note 5, at 777 n.66 (characterizing local rulemaking as a legislatively approved ―gap 
filling function‖).
13. FED. R. CIV. P. 83(b). Rule 83(b) is most commonly relied on as the source for a judge‘s 
power to develop general standing orders. See generally Myron J. Bromberg & Jonathan M. Korn, 
Individual Judges’ Practices: An Inadvertent Subversion of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 68 
ST. JOHN‘S L. REV. 1 (1994).
14. Rule 83(b) may not completely exhaust the need to employ inherent authority to address 
procedural gaps, however. Inherent authority may be necessary to justify some actions—say, for the 
court to examine its own jurisdiction—that do not qualify as ―regulat[ing] practice.‖ See FED. R.
CIV. P. 83(b).
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power to deal with procedural gaps is therefore gratuitous under the cur-
rent framework,15 and indeed may occasionally be problematic.16
B. Inherent Power as an Escape Valve 
Inherent power acts as an escape valve when it is used as an alterna-
tive source of authority in situations where a more formal procedure also 
applies. Suppose a rule directs that courts must wait twenty days before 
taking a particular action. If a court cites inherent power to take that 
same action after only ten days, then the power is being used not to ad-
dress an unanticipated or unaddressed procedural question, but instead to 
circumvent the answer provided by a competing source of authority.17
This is a much more contestable use of inherent power. Indeed, with 
very limited exceptions, the use of inherent power in this manner has 
been properly criticized as inconsistent with basic principles of constitu-
tional structure. Perhaps it would be enough to stop there, but in this sec-
tion I also want to suggest that this use of inherent authority is proble-
matic in two additional respects: first, that it frustrates the reasonable 
expectations of litigants and may even conflict with due process prin-
ciples in some cases, and second, that it compromises the rulemaking 
process and undermines procedural reform efforts. 
1. Constitutional Structure 
Escape valve cases involve a direct inter-branch conflict.18 This is 
not true of gap-filler cases, where by definition no applicable rule or sta-
tute—and thus no source of authority traceable to the legislative 
branch—is present. The only question in those cases is whether the judi-
cial branch has the power to act without specific authorization. But the 
use of a judicially-sourced inherent power to bypass a legislatively-
sourced rule is different, and raises a question of constitutional dimen-
sion. Now the question is whether the courts can disregard or override 
legislative action, and the answer to that turns on who is charged with the 
ultimate authority to define the procedural rules in the federal system. 
15. This is not to say that inherent power is being used in gap-filling cases to go beyond Rule 
83. To the contrary, in most cases, inherent power and Rule 83(b) provide alternative paths to the 
same procedural result. But in my view, it is worth being attentive and careful about the source of 
power, even where it will not affect the result in a formal sense.
16. The use of inherent power would be problematic if, for example, a district court attempted 
to introduce and enforce a procedural requirement without providing actual notice to the litigant in 
advance. Rule 83 limits the ability to regulate practice by imposing a notice requirement before 
procedures not found in a formal rule or statute are enforced. Enforcing a procedural requirement 
without actual notice would therefore conflict with Rule 83, and employing inherent authority to that 
end would properly be viewed as an example of inherent authority as an escape valve.
17. This is by design a very clear example, but I readily acknowledge that not all instances of 
inherent power as escape valve are so clear. See infra Part II.
18. There is a potential for intra-branch conflict, too, particularly where the competing source 
of procedural authority derives from a higher court‘s use of supervisory power. For a thoughtful 
discussion of supervisory power, see Amy Coney Barrett, The Supervisory Power of the Supreme 
Court, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 324 (2006).
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Since the introduction of the federal rules regime, much has been 
written about the proper constitutional relationship between legislative 
and judicial rulemaking.19 Although extreme positions have been staked 
out,20 the dominant view seems to be very close to that recently articu-
lated by Professor Burbank: 
If Congress chooses to exercise its power, it has the last word on mat-
ters of procedure, subject only to the specific limitations of the Con-
stitution (i.e., in the Bill of Rights) and to a limitation that, although 
difficult to phrase precisely, prevents Congress, as a matter of separa-
tion of powers, from depriving the federal courts of powers that are 
necessary for them to act as such—to function as courts exercising 
judicial power under Article III—when deciding cases.21
Federal rules, of course, are not statutes, but they derive from con-
gressional action22 and are treated as statutory equivalents.23 Because it 
reflects a congressional decision to exercise its power, the existence of an 
applicable rule must therefore be treated as ―the last word,‖ unless the 
court can articulate a constitutional reason for why the rule extends 
beyond the limits of congressional rulemaking authority. While the pre-
cise scope of those limits remains unclear,24 the fundamental principle 
that the presence of rules can constrain judicial authority that otherwise 
might be implied in their absence is well settled. Indeed, courts them-
selves routinely acknowledge that principle, even though they do not 
always articulate its constitutional basis.25
19. See sources cited supra note 5.
20. Compare Wigmore‘s assertion that only courts had rulemaking power, John H. Wigmore, 
All Legislative Rules for Judiciary Procedure are Void Constitutionally, 23 U. ILL. L. REV. 276 
(1928), with Clark‘s contention that legislative supremacy in the realm of procedure was essentially 
limitless, Charles E. Clark, The Proper Function of the Supreme Court’s Federal Rules Committee, 
28 A.B.A. J. 521 (1942).
21. Burbank, supra note 3, at 1688.
22. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2071–2075 (2006).
23. Bank of Nova Scotia v. United States, 487 U.S. 250, 255 (1988) (noting that the Federal 
Rules are ―as binding as any statute duly enacted by Congress, and federal courts have no more 
discretion to disregard the Rule[s‘] mandate than they do to disregard constitutional or statutory 
provisions‖).
24. There is a vast academic literature concerning the existence and definition of ―essential‖ 
or ―irreducible‖ judicial power. For a sampling, see Ryan, supra note 5, at 785–87, and Pushaw, 
supra note 5, at 741–44. Within the sphere of essential judicial power, courts arguably have the 
constitutional authority to disregard any legislative attempt to control their behavior. Nothing in my 
argument turns on which conception of essential judicial power is correct, and so I take no view on 
that question here. It is enough to say that if a court concludes that a particular rule falls within the 
sphere of essential judicial power, however defined, it should say so explicitly. Absent any such 
claim, or some other claim of constitutional infirmity, a legislatively-sourced rule should be en-
forced. 
25. See, e.g., In re Atlantic Pipe Corp., 304 F.3d 135, 143 (1st Cir. 2002) (―[I]nherent powers 
cannot be exercised in a manner that contradicts an applicable statute or rule.‖); G. Heileman Brew-
ing Co. v. Joseph Oat Corp., 871 F.2d 648, 652 (7th Cir. 1989) (―[T]he district court . . . may not 
exercise its inherent authority in a manner inconsistent with rule or statute.‖). But courts have not 
always interpreted this constraint to mean that when a rule is on point, the rule, rather than inherent 
power, must be the source of judicial action. Thus, even after acknowledging this principle in Cham-
bers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 47 (1991), the Supreme Court concluded that inherent power 
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2. Fairness 
One of the advantages of rules is that they are easy to discover and 
knowable in advance. Before litigation begins, parties and lawyers can 
consult the rules and form a reasonable understanding of the procedural 
requirements that will govern their dispute. The existence of a uniform 
and stable set of rules thus reduces surprise and promotes fairness by 
allowing actors in the system to structure their behavior in ways that con-
form to procedural expectations.26 Supplementation of the formal rules 
from a source that is undefined and unknowable in advance is destabiliz-
ing, and leads to results that are less uniform and less predictable.27
As with constitutional structure, escape valve cases differ from gap-
filler cases when it comes to fairness considerations. When parties and 
litigants look to formal sources of authority and find nothing, they should 
not presume that there is simply no answer to the question. But when a 
rule speaks to an issue, those who encounter it are much more likely to 
conclude that what is contained there constitutes a complete and accurate 
description of the procedural requirements that may be imposed in the 
case with respect to that issue.28
Of course, at some level reasonable expectations are structured by 
what courts say about what is reasonable. That is, if courts routinely 
staked out the position that rules are subject to supplementation by inhe-
rent power, then at some point it would become unreasonable for those 
affected by the rules to assume otherwise. But this is not what courts 
say,29 and thus even very attentive participants in litigation are likely to 
be misled when they encounter a rule that appears to address a particular 
issue. At some level, then, the fairness concern here is rooted not in some 
existed even in the face of a rule addressed to the same issue. Id. at 49 (―The Court‘s prior cases 
have indicated that the inherent power of a court can be invoked even if procedural rules exist which 
sanction the same conduct.‖). In other words, courts may conclude that the exercise of inherent 
power is unconstrained either by finding that the rule simply does not address the issue, or that it 
addresses it in a way that does not displace the availability of inherent power as an alternative. See
infra Part II.
26. See Chambers, 501 U.S. at 68 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (―These definite standards give 
litigants notice of proscribed conduct and make possible meaningful review for misuse of discre-
tion—review which focuses on the misapplication of legal standards.‖). Of course, this does not 
mean that the rules alone put litigants in a position to predict procedural requirements perfectly. 
After all, the rules themselves may be ambiguous, which makes them subject to interpretation, or 
they may confer discretion, which may be exercised in an unpredictable manner. See Robert G. 
Bone, Who Decides? A Critical Look at Procedural Discretion, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 1961, 1970 
(2007) (discussing interpretation and discretion as ways that judges influence the content of rules).
27. In part due to concerns about predictability, notice, and transparency, the Third Circuit, in 
Eash v. Riggins Trucking Inc., expressed a preference for the use of local rules rather than inherent 
power to deal with gaps in the rules. 757 F.2d 557, 568–70 (3d Cir. 1985).
28. To some extent, these concerns may be mitigated by a requirement that parties be given 
notice of a procedural requirement justified by inherent power before that requirement may be en-
forced. But while courts often impose a notice requirement, they do not always do so. See, e.g., Link 
v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 632 (1962) (enforcing a sua sponte dismissal based on inherent 
authority despite the absence of notice).
29. See cases cited supra note 25.
File: Jordan_FINAL_031010 Created on:  3/10/2010 3:52:00 PM Last Printed: 4/7/2010 5:26:00 PM 
8 DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 87 
unavoidable problem with the use of inherent authority to supplement 
written rules, but in the disconnect that presently exists between judicial 
rhetoric and judicial practice.30
3. Rulemaking 
Finally, the use of inherent authority to bypass the requirements re-
flected in formal rules has the potential to affect rulemaking. Rules re-
flect choices, and those choices are the product of a statutorily-created 
process that is designed to involve input from a variety of sources. In-
voking inherent power to avoid constraints imposed by rules is tanta-
mount to permitting judges to substitute their individual choices for those 
reached through the formal rulemaking process.31
This substitution is troublesome because it exacerbates procedural 
disuniformity in the federal system. The shift from conformity to a re-
gime of federal rules was motivated in large part by a desire to promote 
uniform procedural standards.32 Uniformity in turn was expected to con-
tribute to reduced barriers to national legal practice and increased equali-
ty in the outcomes reached across the federal system.33 Allowing courts 
to invoke inherent authority to escape the uniform requirements imposed 
by the federal rules undermines those goals.34
A second cause for concern is that the excessive use of inherent 
power decreases the significance of the rulemaking process. If rules are 
truly binding, then the choices embedded in those rules have a great deal 
of importance. Judges have a role in the rulemaking process,35 and the 
30. See infra Part II.
31. United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727, 737 (1980) (rejecting the use of supervisory power 
when it ―amounts to a substitution of individual judgment for the controlling decisions of this 
Court‖); see also Bank of Nova Scotia v. United States, 487 U.S. 250, 255 (1988) (―The balance 
struck by the Rule between societal costs and the rights of the accused may not casually be over-
looked ‗because a court has elected to analyze the question under the supervisory power.‘‖ (quoting 
Payner, 447 U.S. at 736)).
32. See, e.g., Burbank, supra note 9, at 1043. This is not inconsistent with an acknowledge-
ment that the rules do not fully describe the procedural universe. See supra Part I.A. Rather, the rules 
reflect a desire to impose uniform standards in certain procedural contexts, namely, those contexts to 
which a promulgated rule is directed.
33. See William B. Rubenstein, The Concept of Equality in Civil Procedure, 23 CARDOZO L.
REV. 1865, 1893–97 (2002); David L. Shapiro, Federal Rule 16: A Look at the Theory and Practice 
of Rulemaking, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1969, 1974 (1989).
34. See G. Heileman Brewing Co. v. Joseph Oat Corp., 871 F.2d 648, 666 (7th Cir. 1989) 
(Ripple, J., dissenting) (―Today‘s decision is indeed hard to reconcile with the underlying Congres-
sional concern for uniformity of practice in the federal courts. Indeed, the majority encourages the 
individual district court to march to its own drummer.‖); see also Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 
U.S. 32, 69 (1991) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
35. Only members of the Supreme Court and those selected for service on rulemaking com-
mittees have a direct role. But other judges may participate meaningfully if indirectly in a variety of 
ways, such as communicating with rulemaking committees or writing opinions that agitate for pro-
cedural modification. It is perhaps worth noting that judicial involvement in the process is not the 
result of entitlement, but of legislative design. See generally Martin H. Redish and Uma M. 
Amuluru, The Supreme Court, the Rules Enabling Act, and the Politicization of the Federal Rules: 
Constitutional and Statutory Implications, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1303 (2006) (discussing the 
implications of the Rules Enabling Act). 
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prospect that they will be meaningfully constrained provides them with 
an incentive to ensure that the choices made are optimal by participating 
fully in the rulemaking process. But if the rules are merely one source of 
authority among many, and are subject to supplementation or evasion by 
reference to inherent power, then the initial choices made through the 
rulemaking process are less significant, and the judicial incentives to 
invest in that process are reduced.36 This is the problem that strikes clos-
est to the heart of the question being considered by this law review issue. 
Reform through rulemaking is meaningful only if the rules themselves 
are meaningful. At the extreme, a broad understanding of inherent power 
makes the rules less meaningful, and makes changes to those rules less 
effective. 
II. RULE INTERPRETATION AND ROLE CONFUSION
Inherent power may be used legitimately (if unnecessarily) to fill 
gaps in formal procedural rules or illegitimately to avoid constraints im-
posed by those rules. As a conceptual matter, the distinction between 
these two roles is straightforward. But the distinction is much harder in 
practice because it depends on a determination of whether formal rules 
address a particular situation and whether the exercise of inherent power 
is consistent with those rules. Put differently, the distinction turns on a 
judicial interpretation of the scope and effect of the federal rules. 
Through this interpretive act, courts have the flexibility to refashion po-
tential escape valves as gap-fillers, and thus to sustain the exercise of 
inherent power as legitimate. 
To see this interpretive flexibility at work, consider G. Heileman 
Brewing v. Joseph Oat Corp.37 In Heileman, the en banc Seventh Circuit 
addressed the question of whether a district judge could compel the at-
tendance of a corporate representative at a pre-trial settlement confe-
rence.38 Rule 16(a)(5) provided authority to compel the attendance of 
attorneys and unrepresented parties, but the order in question fell outside 
the scope of that formal authority because the corporation was 
represented.39 Thus, the question was whether the order could instead be 
sustained by reference to inherent power. Rule 16(a)(5) might sensibly 
be read to delineate the permissible range of parties who may be com-
36. See Chambers, 501 U.S. at 67 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (―Disregard of applicable Rules 
also circumvents the rulemaking procedures in 28 U.S.C. 2071 et seq., which Congress designed to 
assure that procedural innovations like those announced today ‗shall be introduced only after mature 
consideration of informed opinion from all relevant quarters, with all the opportunities for compre-
hensive and integrated treatment which such consideration affords.‘‖ (quoting Miner v. Atlass, 363 
U.S. 641, 650 (1960))); Strandell v. Jackson County, Ill., 838 F.2d 884, 886–87 (7th Cir. 1988) 
(―[I]n those areas of trial practice where the Supreme Court and the Congress, acting together, have 
addressed the appropriate balance between the needs for judicial efficiency and the rights of the 
individual litigant, innovation by the individual judicial officer must conform to that balance.‖).
37. 871 F.2d 648 (7th Cir. 1989) (en banc).
38. Id. at 652.
39. Id. at 651.
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pelled to attend a conference, and indeed that interpretation was urged by 
several judges in dissent.40 Viewed this way, any attempt to compel a 
party not listed in the rule—like the represented party at issue in the 
case—would constitute an exercise of inherent power as an escape valve. 
To avoid that result, the majority instead interpreted the scope of Rule 
16(a)(5) narrowly: it provided specific authority to compel certain atten-
dees, and nothing more.41 As to those not mentioned, the rule was si-
lent.42 Thus, the question at issue fell into a procedural gap, and inherent 
power could properly be employed to fill it.43
Many cases involving questions of inherent power are similar to 
Heileman in the sense that they are capable of classification as either a 
gap-filler or an escape valve.44 And as in Heileman, courts seem willing 
to use the process of interpretation to sustain the exercise of inherent 
power by viewing the scope of a potentially applicable rule narrowly. 
This approach formally respects the principle that inherent power cannot 
act as an escape valve.45 But it simultaneously minimizes the impact of 
that principle by limiting escape valve cases to those ―where the rules 
directly mandate a specific procedure to the exclusion of others.‖46 In all 
other cases, courts remain free to interpret formal rules either as inap-
40. See id. at 658 (Coffey, J., dissenting); id. at 666–67 (Manion, J., dissenting).
41. Id. at 654 (majority opinion).
42. Id. at 653 (concluding that represented parties were ―not proscribed or specifically ad-
dressed‖ by Rule 16(a)(5)).
43. Id. at 656.
44. Natural Gas Pipeline Co. of America v. Energy Gathering, Inc., 2 F.3d 1397 (5th Cir. 
1993), is another example. The question at issue there concerned the ability of a district court to 
compel production of tax returns from a non-party during post-judgment discovery. Rule 69 permits 
discovery ―in the aid of the judgment . . . in the manner provided in these rules or in the manner 
provided by the practice of the state in which the district court is held.‖ FED. R. CIV. P. 69(a). The 
Fifth Circuit considered Texas practice, but concluded that it did not fully authorize the district 
court‘s action. Natural Gas, 2 F.3d at 1406. As for the federal rules, Rules 34 and 45 authorize 
discovery from non-parties. But those rules likewise did not authorize the district court‘s action 
because no subpoena was issued, and because any subpoena issued by the district court would not 
have been issued by ―the court for the district in which the production or inspection is to be made.‖ 
FED. R. CIV. P. 45(A)(2). Despite this, the Fifth Circuit found that the district court had inherent 
authority to act, although it found some fault with the specific action taken. Natural Gas, 2 F.3d at 
1411. At first blush, the existence of a rule clearly addressed to the question of when post-judgment 
discovery may be ordered makes Natural Gas Pipeline look like a clear example of inherent power 
being used as an escape valve. But as in Heileman, the court took pains to avoid that 
characterization, instead focusing on the permissive language contained in the rules and concluding 
that ―Rule 69(a) and Rule 34(c) do not purport to define the sole means of obtaining post-judgment 
document discovery or production from a non-party.‖ Id. at 1408. 
45. In Heileman, as in most cases involving inherent power, the court paid lip service to the 
idea that inherent power may not conflict with formal procedural authority. Heileman, 871 F.2d at 
652 (―Obviously, the district court, in devising means to control cases before it, may not exercise its 
inherent authority in a manner inconsistent with rule or statute.‖).
46. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Landau & Cleary, Ltd. v. Hribar Trucking, 
Inc., 867 F.2d 996, 1002 (7th Cir. 1989)). The Supreme Court has followed suit. See Chambers v. 
NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 47 (1991) (―‗[W]e do not lightly assume that Congress has intended to 
depart from established principles‘ such as the scope of a court‘s inherent power.‖ (quoting Wein-
berger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 313 (1982))). 
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plicable, or as applicable but nevertheless consistent with the supplemen-
tary use of inherent power.47
There is a similarity in all of this to the interpretive contortions that 
may be observed in the judicial application of the Erie doctrine.48 Since 
Hanna v. Plumer,49 federal courts have been instructed to determine 
whether there is a federal directive on point. To do so, courts must define 
the scope of the rule, and the results have been frustratingly unclear and 
inconsistent.50 In the Erie context, observers have long suspected that at 
least some of the confusion stems from a judicial resistance to conclude 
that a directive is on point in cases where that conclusion would 
necessitate a subsequent finding that the federal directive is 
constitutionally defective. To avoid that result, courts instead interpret 
the rule narrowly, even if that narrow interpretation is cramped and 
unnatural.  
A similar phenomenon may be at play in the context of inherent 
power. Suppose that courts are interested in protecting the broad exercise 
of inherent power. Interpreting the rule narrowly serves that goal by 
permitting the exercise to be characterized as a gap-filler. A broader in-
terpretation would require the courts either to limit the domain of inhe-
rent authority, or to conclude that the rule in question is constitutionally 
suspect because it infringes on the ―essential judicial power.‖51 Thus, the 
tendency toward narrow interpretation may reflect a simultaneous desire 
to preserve judicial power and avoid a constitutional showdown. What-
ever the reason, there seems to be some resistance to finding a conflict 
between a formal rule and inherent power, and that resistance has given 
rise to something resembling a clear statement regime: absent an explicit 
and unambiguous statement to the contrary, formal rules should be inter-
preted to permit the exercise of inherent power.52
47. Alternatively, courts sometimes find that the use of inherent power is not in conflict with 
the rule, even if not technically consistent with it, because it is compatible with the spirit of the rule. 
Heileman itself is an example. See Heileman, 871 F.2d at 652 (noting that ―[the] spirit, intent, and 
purpose [of Rule 16] is . . . broadly remedial‖ (alterations in original) (internal quotation marks 
omitted) (quoting In re Baker, 744 F.2d 1438, 1440 (10th Cir. 1984) (en banc))). Another example is 
Chambers. 501 U.S. at 50–51. Not surprisingly, the response to these efforts is to emphasize the 
relevance of language. See id. at 69 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (―We are bound, however, by the Rules 
themselves, not their ‗aim‘ . . . .‖); see also Heileman, 871 F.2d at 666 (Manion, J., dissenting) 
(rejecting reliance on a rule‘s ―‗broadly remedial‘ ‗spirit,‘‖ and noting that the broad goal of Rule 16 
―is not an excuse for us to ignore the words the drafters used to pursue that goal‖).
48. See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938). 
49. 380 U.S. 460 (1965).
50. For a sampling of the extensive litany of complaints directed at this inconsistency, see 
Donald L. Doernberg, The Unseen Track of Erie Railroad: Why History and Jurisprudence Suggest 
a More Straightforward Form of Erie Analysis, 109 W. VA. L. REV. 611 (2007), and Joseph P. 
Bauer, The Erie Doctrine Revisited: How a Conflicts Perspective Can Aid the Analysis, 74 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 1235, 1244 (1999). 
51. See infra Part I.B.1. 
52. For a general discussion of clear statement rules, see William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. 
Frickey, Quasi-constitutional Law: Clear Statement Rules as Constitutional Lawmaking, 45 VAND.
L. REV. 593, 595–98 (1992). This general approach has received some academic support, even if not 
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III. CLARIFYING THE RELATIONSHIP
When discussing the relationship between inherent power and the 
rules, courts routinely recognize the power of the latter to act as a con-
straint on the exercise of the former. But a finding that such a constraint 
is actually present is much less common. The explanation for this result 
is that courts implicitly or explicitly employ a norm of construction that 
views rules narrowly. Unless an existing rule contains a clear and affir-
mative statement that creates an unavoidable conflict, inherent power is 
deemed to be available as an alternative source of judicial power to justi-
fy the imposition of procedural requirements in a given case. This results 
in a role for inherent power that is both unpredictable and excessively 
broad. This section explores a number of ways that the relationship be-
tween inherent power and the rules might be clarified and improved. 
As a starting point, courts might simply adopt a norm of construc-
tion that is more respectful of the status of the rules. More specifically, 
courts should abandon the requirement of a clear statement before find-
ing that a rule restricts the availability of inherent power. Indeed, the 
presumption should run the other way, such that the presence of a rule is 
suggestive of intent to substitute a formal rule-based procedural frame-
work in place of inherent power. The adoption of a federal rules regime 
was rooted in legislative desire for a formal set of uniform rules applica-
ble throughout the federal system. If the rulemaking process produces a 
rule that addresses a certain issue, courts should approach the task of 
interpretation with that preference for uniformity in mind and refrain 
from disrupting the balance struck by the rule. To be sure, even a strong 
presumption in favor of rule supremacy does not completely solve the 
problem of determining scope and coverage. But the practical effect of a 
shift in interpretive norms would be to increase the frequency of escape 
valve cases, strengthen the effect of formal rules, and decrease the avail-
ability of inherent power. 
Of course, courts are self-interested, and may resist an interpretive 
norm that has the practical effect of reducing their autonomy to fashion 
procedural requirements. For that reason, it may be preferable to work 
within the clear statement framework by inserting a definition of in-
tended scope on a rule-by-rule basis. If a clear statement of intent to con-
strain the exercise of inherent power is desired, then the rules could be 
systematically amended to provide those statements. For example, Rule 
phrased precisely in terms of a clear statement rule. For example, Professor Meador has noted with 
approval that ―[p]re-existing inherent authority can remain available to supplement the rules if the 
rules are interpreted . . . not to prohibit the particular exercise of inherent authority.‖ Daniel J. 
Meador, Inherent Judicial Authority in the Conduct of Civil Litigation, 73 TEX. L. REV. 1805, 1817 
(1995) (emphasis added). This suggestion not only recognizes the role of interpretation in defining 
the status of a given case, but also embodies an eagerness to exploit that role to permit the broad 
exercise of inherent power wherever possible.
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37 might be amended to specify that it delineates the scope of judicial 
authority to impose sanctions in the context of discovery.53
Alternatively, of course, the rules might be amended to make clear 
that inherent power still remains available to supplement the require-
ments described in a particular rule. So Rule 37 might instead be 
amended to state clearly that it is merely one possible source of sanction-
ing power, and that it is not intended to limit the availability of sanctions 
based on other sources of authority. Judges would thus be authorized to 
invoke inherent power as an escape valve from the rule, and would not 
be forced to use a strained interpretation to characterize the case as a 
gap-filler. My own view is that the former option is preferable to the 
latter, at least in the context of Rule 37 if not as a general matter. But 
either would be an improvement. A clear specification of the relationship 
between the written rules and inherent power would have the salutary 
effect of requiring rule-makers to consider the nature of that relationship 
explicitly, and would provide much clearer guidance to those affected by 
the rules.  
But a rule-by-rule approach would render the rules even more un-
wieldy than they already are. A more elegant solution would be to add a 
rule that establishes the general status of the rules and provides interpre-
tive guidance. Indeed, we already have such a rule: Rule 1 instructs 
judges to interpret the rules ―to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive 
determination of every action and proceeding,‖54 and courts routinely 
cite to that rule as an interpretive aid.55 Rule 1 might easily be amended 
to specify that where rules are present, they are intended to define the 
permissible scope of behavior by litigants and judges, and are subject to 
supplementation only where explicitly provided for.56 Such a statement 
would act much like an express preemption of inherent power, and while 
it would not avoid all issues related to coverage, it would strengthen the 
status of the rules and helpfully structure the interpretive enterprise. 
CONCLUSION
Discussions about procedural reform often start from the premise 
that amendments to the rules will produce meaningful change in the pro-
cedural requirements that are enforced on the ground. That is undoubted-
53. A caveat would be necessary to account for other statutory sources of sanctioning power, 
which could not be overridden by a rule.
54. FED. R. CIV. P. 1.
55. See, e.g., Wood v. GCC Bend, LLC, 422 F.3d 873, 882–83 (9th Cir. 2005) (denying a 
Rule 54(b) certification request in light of Rule 1‘s mandate); In re Beverly Hills Bancorp, 752 F.2d 
1334, 1338 (9th Cir. 1984) (holding that to permit amendment of pleadings after losing appeal would 
not further Rule 1‘s directive).
56. In the face of such a statement, judges may still be able to resort to inherent power. But to 
do so, they would need to make an explicit finding that the power that they are exerting is part of the 
―essential judicial power‖ that as a constitutional matter is not subject to interference by legislative 
action.
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ly true to some extent; rules do matter, and their influence on procedure 
is significant. But the impact of rules may not be as great as we some-
times assume. Other sources of authority compete with formal rules, and 
an excessively broad understanding of those other sources weakens the 
practical force of the rulemaking process. In my view, the understanding 
of when inherent authority may be exercised in the face of the rules is 
excessively broad, at least as it is reflected in judicial practice. Accor-
dingly, a careful reconsideration of how the rules affect and interact with 
inherent power is in order. 
